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IMPEACHMENT OF THE ACCUSED BY PRIOR CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS
State v. Murdock
172 Ohio St. 221, 174 N.E.2d 543 (1961)
Murdock was convicted of driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor1 in the Berea Municipal Court. During the cross-
examination of Murdock, the prosecution was permitted to question the
accused about a prior conviction under the same statute. The Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but certified the case
to the Ohio Supreme Court because of a conflict with a decision of the
Erie County Court of Appeals.2 In a unanimous opinion the Supreme
Court of Ohio affirmed the conviction and held that the prior conviction
was within the scope of section 2945.423 and might be used to impeach
the credibility of the accused.
At common law, a witness was disqualified from testifying if he had
been convicted of treason, a felony or a misdemeanor involving dishonesty
or falsehood.4 Such disqualification has been generally abrograted by
statutory enactments,5 and the fact of a prior conviction now goes to
the weight of the testimony. The Ohio statute removing the disqualifica-
tion of a witness in a criminal prosecution for prior criminal conviction
has undergone only minor revisions since its first enactment.6 The inter-
pretation given the statute by the Ohio court is not uncommon.7 However,
the largest number of jurisdictions hold that the removal of the disquali-
fication means the witness may be impeached only by crimes of moral
turpitude; others allow impeachment for infamous crimes. Other ju-
risdictions adopt a view similar to that of Ohio or leave the decision as
to what convictions may be used for impeachment to the discretion of
the trial judge.8 The Model Code of Evidence suggests that unless the
accused attempts to establish his credibility on the witness stand, he
may not be impeached in this manner.9
The ruling of this court that all crimes, either felonies or mis-
1 Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.19 (1953).
2 State v. Hickman, 102 Ohio App. 78, 141 N.E.2d 202 (1956).
3 "No person is disqualified as a witness in a criminal prosecution . . . . by
reason of his conviction of crime ... such ...conviction may be shown for the
purpose of affecting the credibility of such witness."
4 McCormick, Evidence § 43 (1954).
5 Ibid.
6 66 Ohio Laws 308 (1869).
7 McCormick, op. cit. supra note 4.
8 Ibid.
) Model Code of Evidence, rule 106 (1942).
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demeanors for which statutes provide penalties,1 0 may be used to affect
the credibility of the accused affimatively settles the rule in Ohio. In
two prior decisions, Harper v. State" and Coble v. State,'2 the court
had stated what convictions could not be used for the purpose of im-
peachment. In the Harper case the court held conviction under a city
ordinance prohibiting purse-snatching could not be used. This was based
directly on the Coble case in which the prosecution had attempted to
use convictions under city ordinances for impeachment. The court said,
"[T]he conviction referred to in this section (66 Ohio Laws 308) which
may be shown for the purpose of affecting credibility, is such and such
only as before the enactment of the section would have disqualified the
person from testifying as a witness."' 3 The court's interpretation of the
statute in the instant case has broadened the Coble rule.14 Before this
decision, it seemed Ohio would apply, for the purposes of impeachment,
a rule which permitted using only those offenses which had formerly
disqualified a witness in a criminal prosecution. 15 There is no Ohio statute
pertaining to witnesses in a civil case parallel to section 2945.42,16 and
the opinion of the court fails to indicate how it would rule in a civil
action.17
The Ohio rule as announced in this case has the virtues of certainty
and ease of application.' 8 The common law had made the issue of
correlation between crime and credibility in part a question of law; whereas,
the new Ohio rule gives the question to the jury. Now the jury must
decide what effect prior convictions for all state and federal crimes have
upon the credibility of the accused.
Some critics contend that a jury might tend to convict the accused
on his record regardless of his substantive innocence in the present trial.' 9
10 State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383, 106 N.E. 50 (1914); State v. Cameron, 89 Ohio
St. 214, 106 N.E. 28 (1914).
11 Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 140 N.E. 364 (1922).
12 Coble v. State, 31 Ohio St. 100 (1876).
13 Id. at 102.
14 August v. Finerty, 30 Ohio C.C.R. 330 (1908) argues that such conviction before
the enactment of the statute was defined by the traditional common law, and anything
else would be in contravention of the constitution.
15 Kornreich v. Industrial Fire Insurance Co., 132 Ohio St. 78, 5 N.E.2d 153
(1936) held that a witness may be cross-examined as to confession to a crime, as
a confession voluntarily given is like a conviction. Until the Murdock case, this was
the most recent pronouncement of the court on the issue and it was this case that was
followed by the Erie court in the Hickman case, supra note 2. In dicta, with three
members of the present court concurring, the court said cross-examination should be
limited to treason, felony, and crimen falsi.
16 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.01, provides who may be a witness.
17 The Kornreich case, supra note 16, was a civil case, and its authority is di-
minished by the Murdock decision.
Is McCormick, op. cit. supra note 4.
19 Ladd, "Credibility Tests-Current Trends," 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166, at 190,
(1940) ; McCormick, op. cit. supra note 4.
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As a result, the accused will refuse to take the stand for fear of prejudicial
cross-examination, 0  with a resulting injustice.2 1 Avoiding this injustice
is the aim of the Model Code of Evidence which does not allow such
impeachment unless the accused attempts to establish his credibility.22
It is unlikely that we will be able to learn whether juries do tend
to convict on the record and are unable or unwilling to differentiate be-
tween the issues of guilt and the credibility of the witness. 23 It would
seem a jury might try to convict a man on his record if his offenses were
in extreme discord with the community sense of morality. Repetitive
crimes such as in the present case might add to the weight of evidence
against the accused which is considered by the jury.
One of the foundations of our society is the protection of the innocent,
and our law declares that the accused is innocent until his guilt is proven.
However, the protection of society is also a goal of the judicial system.
Every reasonable safeguard should be used to guarantee the accused his
"day in court." If the accused may not be impeached by prior criminal
conviction unless he makes an issue of his credibility, society runs the risk
that such convictions do affect credibility, and a guilty defendant may
escape prosecution. Any rule less favorable to the accused, however, runs
the same risk of injustice as the present rules.24 Until the correlation of
credibility and conviction of crime is established, a rule like that of Ohio
gives a maximum protection to society if not the individual.
20 Ladd, Id. at 191.
21 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) shows this is not such an injustice
as to offend due process.
2 Model Code of Evidence, op. cit. supra note 10, comment 3 to rule 106.
23 The premise that a conviction affects the credibility of an accused is attacked
by Professor Ladd, op. cit. supra note 19. He points out that this impeachment differs
from other types. Perhaps the Ford Foundation-University of Chicago study will
produce information on the jury's basis of decision, but as yet it is not available.
24 Except in the number of cases in which the issue of repetition would be
excluded from jury consideration.
